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et al.: Recent Decisions

RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Equal Protection of the LawsStatute requiring notice by publication must provide indigents
method of payment for such notice. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys (N.Y.
1968).
Plaintiff initiated a suit for divorce based on abandonment.
Lacking adequate financial resources necessary to prosecute the
action, she obtained leave to proceed as a "poor person."' Dilgent efforts to ascertain the whereabouts and continued existence of her husband proved fruitless, necessitating the requirement of notice by publication. 2 Upon consent of the City of New
York, an order was entered permitting service of summons by
publication, the expense to be borne by the City. The City requested leave to withdraw consent and relitigate the order, 3 and
the New York Supreme Court granted the City's motion to
reconsider the question of whether the New York "poor persons"
statutes provided for payment, out of public funds, of auxiliary
1. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1101 (McKinney 1963) provides in part:
Upon motion of any person, the court in which an action is
triable . . . may grant permission to proceed as a poor person.
The moving party shall file his affidavit setting forth the amount
and sources of his income and listing his property with its value;
[and] that he is unable to pay the costs, fees and expenses necessary to prosecute ... the action ....
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1102(d) (McKinney 1963) provides, in part, that "[a] poor
person shall not be liable for the payment of any costs or fees unless a recovery by judgment or by settlement is had in his favor ...."
2. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 308(4) (McKinney 1963) provides that personal service
upon a natural person shall be made "in such manner as the court, upon motion
without notice, directs if [other] notice is impractical . . . ."; N.Y.C.P.L.R.
§ 314 (McKinney 1963) provides, in part, that "[s]ervice may be made without
the state ... in the same manner as service is made within the state ... in
a matrimonial action ...."; N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 315 (McKinney 1963) provides
that "[t]he court, upon motion without notice, shall order service of a summons by publication in aa action described in section 314 if service cannot be
made by another prescribed method with due diligence."
3. The court held in the first proceeding of this case that the "poor persons" statutes afforded relief to indigents for publication costs. However, the
consent of the City to pay the costs made the issue moot. By withdrawing its
consent, the city could relitigate the issue and obtain a high court determination of its obligations under the "poor persons" statutes.
Plaintiff's counsel were acting without compensation under the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Since one of the purposes of the program is to make new law through test cases, plaintiff's counsel
also wanted to relitigate the issue to make this such a case. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys,
296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 77 (Sup. Ct. 1968); see Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 57 Misc. 2d
416, 292 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
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expenses, including publication costs, in civil actions. Determining that they did not, the court held that because, in New York,
divorce necessitated due judicial proceedings, service by publication being prerequisite to access to the civil courts, plaintiff
was denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
New York and Federal Constitutions. 4 Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 296
N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
Based on provisions in Magna Carta,5 poor persons in England were given the right at common law to seek relief in forma
pauperis in the Court of Chancery6 without payment of security
for costs; and upon filing an affidavit of poverty, the court
would assign them counsel free of charge, regardless of whether
counsel wished to represent them. The right to sue in forma7
pauperis was extended in 1495 to the courts of law by a statute
which provided for appointment of counsel to serve without fee
and also exempted fees for writs and services of court officers.
While there is considerable diversity among the American
states as to what litigation expenses an indigent person need not
pay, the states have generally followed the English common law
as expanded by statute in drafting their own in forma pauperis
statutes.8 Most states provide, in general terms, that the poor
need not prepay fees, court costs, or security therefor, and that
indigents shall have all the necessary writs, process, appearances,
and proceedings. 9 While these statutes provide for the waiver or
deferment of costs, none of the thirty-four jurisdictions which
have enacted them, 10 including the federal government, have
expressly provided for payment of auxiliary expenses" out of
public funds.' 2
4. U.S.

CONST. amend. XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. I,

§§ 9, 11.

5. Chapter 40 of Magna Carta provides that "to no one will we sell, to no

one will we refuse or delay, right or justice." W.

McKECHNE, MAGNA CARTA:

A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 395

6. 1 E.

DANIELL,

PLEADING

AND

PRACTICE

OF THE

(2d ed. 1914).

HIGH

COURT OF

38, 43 (6th Am. Ed. 1927).
7. 11 Hen. VII, c. 12 § 4 (1495); see 4 W. HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 538 (2d ed. 1927).
8. Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo.
L.J. 516, 527 (1968); Note, Proceedings In. Forma Pauperis, 9 U. FLA. L.
Rxv. 65, 71 (1956).
9. Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo.
L.J. 516, 528 (1968).
10. Id. at 523.
11. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 79 (Sup. Ct. 1968) ; supra note 9,
CHANCERY

at 517. Auxiliary expenses include publications costs, witness fees, printing

expenses, expert witnesses, and general investigation costs.
12. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
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In the absence of express statutory provision, some courts

have held that they have the power to authorize waiver of certain court costs; 13 but practically all courts hold that any provision for payment out of public funds for any costs incurred by
indigents in judicial proceedings must be enacted by the authority of the legislature and not by the courts. 14 Thus, auxiliary
expenses present no problem in personal injury cases, because
they are paid by attorneys under contingent retainers; nor do
they present a problem in most other civil cases, since the cases
may be settled out of court. However, they do present a very
difficult problem for indigents in divorce cases when a settlement cannot be made without them.
In the absence of statutory provisions in criminal cases, the
indigent's problem of paying auxiliary expenses was solved by
applying the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."; Traditionally, the test applied to a state statute in determining whether it was a denial of equal protection was whether
it was discriminatory on its face, or sought to classify groups
arbitrarily, or, though neutral in formulation, was wilfully
discriminatory in its application by the state.'" The concept of
equal protection was given a totally different perspective when
GriffinVv. ZIliWis heralded the doctrine that unintentional and
accidental inequality, if it affects important rights of the poor,
violates equal protection to the same extent as does intentional,
hostile, and invidious discrimination.
By applying the Griffin rationale to the New York statute, 18
Jeffreys introduces it into the civil area for the first time, surmounting strong reluctance to do so. 19 This rationale becomes
13. E.g., Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 294, 168 P. 135, 137
(1917) ; Hickey v. Rhine, 16 Tex. 576, 577-78 (1856).

14. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 804, 822 (1968). This was a survey of the
jurisdictions holding that in the absence of statutes counsel for indigents have
no right to compensation from the public.
15. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
16. Id. at 29 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) ; Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206 (1951).
17. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The narrow holding is that when a state requires
transcripts for full appellate review, it must provide them to indigents without
charge.
18. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 315 (McKinney 1963). Like the Illinois statute in
Grifill, these statutes in no way evince a discriminatory purpose or seek to
classify groups arbitrarily; nor was the administration of the law wilfully
discriminatory.
19. See Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967); Bodie v. Connecticut,
286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968).
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the basis in civil courts for striking down, as a denial of equal
protection of the laws, state statutes which require conditions
precedent to the settlement of controversies but fail to provide
methods by which indigents can equally comply with such conditions. Thus, while not completely solving the indigent's problem
of paying for auxiliary expenses in the absence of statutory provision, Jeffreys does create a cornerstone upon which case-bycase development can build.
In view of the recent 20 keen awareness of the plight of the
poor, the result reached by Jeffreys was inevitable. Although
the rationale was applied to a narrow class of cases which
required settlement in court, it would not be surprising to see
its application expanded into other areas of civil law. It remains
to be seen at what point the courts will draw the line in the
future in determining whether a statute violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. It would be a
serious mistake, however, for the courts not to use a balancing
approach in making that determination-whether the underlying right denied is of such substantial magnitude as to make it
unjust and discriminatory for the state to impose a money
hurdle to the exercise of that right.
JiER

RHODES

20. Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-981 (Supp. 1967).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Right to Counsel-A probationer is
not entitled to a Miranda warning when being interviewed by
his supervising probation officer. People v. Anonymous (N.Y.
1968).
The defendant was indicted by the Nassau County Grand
Jury for burglary in the third degree, grand larceny in the first
degree, and possession of burglar's tools. On September 1, 1966,
the defendant entered a guilty plea to these charges. Adjudged
a youthful offender, he was sentenced to not more than three
years at the Elmira Reception Center. Sentence was suspended
and the defendant was placed on probation.
On July 19, 1967, the defendant entered the Nassau County
office of the Probation Department in the company of another
probationer seeking help for narcotics addiction. The defendant's
supervising probation officer noticed needle marks on the defendant's arm and took him into the office of the deputy
director for questioning. There the defendant reluctantly admitted that he had used heroin two days previously. At no time
was the defendant advised that he might have a right to counsel,
nor did he request the presence of an attorney.
Following a hearing at which the defendant's supervising
probation officer was the sole witness, an amended judgment
was filed revoking the defendant's probation and imposing the
original sentence of the court. On appeal the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division affirmed, holding that a
probationer being examined by his supervising probation officer
is not subjected to "custodial interrogation" and therefore is not
entitled to a Miranda warning before the beginning of such an
examination. People v. Anonymous, 295 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.
1968).
Prior to 1967 the rights accorded a probationer varied from
state to state. A minority of states, including New York, held
that a probationer had a right to counsel at a revocation hearing.' In New York the leading case supporting such a position
was People v. Hamilton.2 The rationale of Hamilton was based
1. Alaska, Massachusetts, and New Mexico constituted this minority. Hoff-

man v. State, 404 P.2d 644 (Alas. 1955); Williams v. Commonwealth, 350

Mass. 732, 216 N.E.2d 799 (1966) ; Blea v. Cox, 75 N.M. 265, 430 P.2d 701

(1965).
2. 25 App. Div. 2d 134, 271 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1966). A defendant accused of

probation violation is entitled to a hearing and has a right to counsel. Such
a defendant must be fully advised of these rights.
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on section 935 of the New York Code4 of Criminal Procedure,3
as interpreted by People v. Reynolds.
The question of a probationer's right to counsel was first
raised in the federal courts in Mempa v. Rhay,5 in which the
United States Supreme Court took the position that a probationer is entitled to counsel at a hearing for the purpose of
revoking probation and imposing a deferred sentence. 6 Although
it would appear that Mempa established the probationer's right
to certain constitutional guarantees at a revocation hearing,
the
some states have disputed the nature of the hearing and
7
nature of the guarantees to be applied to the probationer.
On its face, People v. Anonymous can be distinguished
from both Hamilton and Mempa. The former case presents the
question of right to counsel during questioning by a probation
officer while the latter cases deal solely with right to counsel
at a revocation hearing. The court's decision in People v. AnonyMOus, moreover, is based on a finding that the placing of
the defendant in the Deputy Director's office and subjecting
him to questioning did not constitute "custodial interrogation"
within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona.8 More recently in
Orozco v. Texas,9 however, the Court clarified its position in
3. "On his being arraigned and after an opportunity to be heard the court
may revoke, continue or modify his probation." 66 N.Y.C.C.P. § 935, at 342
(McKinney 1958).

4. 25 App. Div. 2d 487, 266 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1966). The Reynolds court held

that the right to counsel is implicit in the statutory provision that the defendant have an opportunity to be heard.

5. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
6. See 20 S.C.L. Rav. 516 (1968) for a discussion of Mempa.
7. E.g., "The right to a hearing on revocation [of probation] is statutory
and not constitutional. The [revocation] proceeding is not a trial." State v.
Oliver, 247 A.2d 122, 123 (Me. 1968).
[W]hen a person has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced he is in quite a different status than he is before conviction.
He is deemed to be actually serving the sentence imposed, but
under prescribed conditions which he has a need to comply with.
If he could insist on those rights [afforded the accused before
conviction] the court might just as well turn him free in the first
place and not bother with probation.
Velasquez v. Pratt, 443 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Utah 1968).
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Comment, Miranda: Application at Retrials, 19 S.C.L. Rsv. 863 (1967).
9. 89 S. Ct. 1095 (1969). Speaking of Miranda the Court said:
The Miranda opinion declared that the warnings were required
when the person being interrogated was 'in custody at the [police]
station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any way'
* * * (Emphasis added).
Orozco follows the lead of Mathis v. United States, 291 U.S. 1 (1968) in
implementing the Court's holding in Miranda with regard to the definition of
"custody." In Orosco the defendant was interrogated while in bed by four
police officers at 4:00 am.
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Miranda. Orozco defined "custodial interrogation" as any restriction of freedom of action. It is arguable, therefore, that
Orozco will' change the result in People v. Anonymous.
On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, an argument
favoring reversal of People v. Anonymous can be made on the
basis that the Hamilton grant of counsel at the revocation hearing itself should be extended to the period of investigation of
the alleged probation violation. The rationale of Orozco tends
to support such an argument.
By placing the emphasis on any restriction of freedom of
action, Orozco may have placed People v. Anonymous within
an area in which the Miranda warnings will be required. Upon
being placed in the Deputy Director's office the defendant's
freedom of action was restricted since he was not free to leave.
If this reasoning is accepted the courts will be faced with a
most difficult policy decision. The interests of the probationer
in the protection of his constitutional rights and those of society
in a workable system of probation will have to be balanced.
TmM M. LEVY
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FEDERAL TAXATION-Accumulated Earnings Tax-Corporate taxpayer must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that tax avoidance with respect to shareholders was not one of
the purposes for the accumulation of earnings beyond the
reasonable needs of the business. United States v. Donruss Co.
(S. Ct. 1969).
The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for
certiorari in order to resolve the conflict among the circuit
courts over the quantum of purpose necessary for the application
of the accumulated earnings tax under Sections 531-537 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. These provisions impose a surtax upon corporations "formed or availed of for the purpose
of avoiding the income tax with respect to . . . [their] shareholders . . . by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate
instead of being divided or distributed."'
All of the outstanding stock in the respondent corporation
was owned by Don B. Wiener. From 1955 to 1961 the company
operated at a profit, increasing its undistributed earnings fiom
$1,021,288.58 to $1,679,315.37. During this period Wiener declared no dividends. Several reasons were offered for this accumulation' policy, such as capital and inventory requirements,
increasing costs, risks inherent in the business, and the desire
to make investments in the company's major distributor. Nevertheless, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed accumulated earnings taxes for 1960 and 1961. Respondent paid the tax
and brought a suit for refund in the district court.
The district court rendered a judgment for the respondent on
the basis of a jury finding that while there was an unreasonable accumulation of earnings the respondent had not retained
the earnings for the purpose of avoiding the income tax on
Viener. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case on the ground that the district
court's instructions might have led the jury to believe that the
purpose to avoid the tax must be the sole purpose for the
accumulation of earnings. 2 At the same time, the circuit court
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 532(a).
2. The district court rejected the Government's request that the jury be

instructed that:
It is not necessary that avoidance of shareholder's tax be the sole
purpose for the unreasonable accumulation of earnings; it is
sufficient if it is one of the purposes for the company's accumulation policy.
Rather, the court instructed the jury in terms of the statute that tax avoidance
had to be "the purpose" of the accumulations.
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rejected the Government's contention that avoidance of the tax
must simply be one purpose for the accumulation. The court
maintained that the tax could be imposed only if the tax avoidance purpose was the "dominant, controlling, or impelling"
motive for the accumulation.3 In reversing and remanding the
case the Supreme Court held that order to rebut the presumption
found in Section 533 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 4
a taxpayer must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that tax avoidance with respect to shareholders was not one of
the purposes for accumulation of earnings beyond the reasonable
needs of the business. United States v. Donnss Co., 89 S. Ct.
501 (1969).
Before Donruss the circuit courts had established three distinct tests as to the quantum of purpose necessary in order to
impose the accumulated earnings tax. The interpretation urged
by the respondent in Donmuss and accepted by the Sixth Circuit
was first enunciated by the First Circuit. There the court had
asserted that "the ultimate question is not whether the accumulation could be justified as a reasonable business decision, but
whether taxpayer's actual dominant purpose was to avoid the
tax by not distributing profits.""
The position which the Government advocated in the Donruss
case and which the Court accepted had previously found ample
judicial support in the Second and Fifth Circuits. There the
courts had asserted that tax avoidance must be simply one
purpose for the accumulation of earnings. 6 In Baow Manufacturing Co. v. Commiesioner 7 the Fifth Circuit had reasoned
that the utility of the vitally essential presumption arising from
the unreasonable accumulation of earnings or profits "[was]
well nigh destroyed if that presumption in turn [was] saddled
3. United States v. Donruss Co., 384 F2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1967).
4. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 533(a) provides:
For purposes of section 532 the fact that the earnings and profits
of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable

needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid

the income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the corporation
by the preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the contrary.
5. Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 1960).
See also Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1968);
Apollo Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1966).
6. Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961); Trico
Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1943). See also
United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964).
7. 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961).
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with requirement of proof of 'the primary or dominant purpose
of the accumulation'."8 In the 1943 decision of Helvering V.
Chicago Stock Yards Co., 9 the Supreme Court had given its
approval to the "one purpose" test in interpreting Section 102
of the Revenue Act of 1938. While this was not the central
issue of the case, the Court argued forcefully that "the Board's
conclusions may justifiably have been reached in the view that,
whatever the motive when the practice of accumulation was
adopted, the purpose of avoiding surtax induced, or aided in
inducing, the continuance of the practice."10
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits had previously adopted a
third, intermediate standard. These courts had assumed the
somewhat ambiguous position that in order to apply the tax it
was sufficient if the tax avoidance motive be one of the determinative purposes."
An analysis of the relevant legislative history behind Sections
531-537 of the Code reveals that the accumulated earnings tax
has been one congressional attempt to deter use of the corporation to avoid personal income taxes. As the Supreme Court
stated in Chicago Stock Yards, the purpose of the tax "is to
compel the company to distribute any profits not needed for
the conduct of its business so that, when so distributed, individual stockholders will become liable" for taxes on the dividends. 12 The tax originated in the Tariff Act of 1913, which
imposed a surtax upon shareholders if it was found that a corporation was "formed or fraudulently availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of such tax through the
medium of permitting such gains and profits to accumulate
instead of being divided or distributed."' 8 Because of the
difficulty in proving a fraudulent purpose, Congress deleted
the word "fraudulently" from the Revenue Act of 1918.14 In
1921 Congress further modified the accumulated earnings provision so that the tax was imposed upon the corporation rather
than the shareholders.' 8
8. Id. at 82.
9. 318 U.S. 693 (1943).
10. Id. at 699.
11. Kerr-Cochran v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958); World
Pub. Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948).

12.
13.
14.
15.

318 U.S. at 699.
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(A) (2), 38 Stat. 166, 167.
Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 220, 40 Stat. 1072.
Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 220, 42 Stat. 247.
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Despite these measures to increase the effectiveness of the
tax, the problem of avoidance and evasion remained acute. Section 102 of the Revenue Act of 1938 was designed to alleviate
the major problems. Because the difficulty of proving a tax
avoidance purpose had rendered the tax largely ineffective,1 8
Congress addressed itself specifically to this provision. The result was that the corporation was required to prove by a clear
preponderance of the evidence the absence of the purpose to
avoid the tax, if first it had been found that there was an
accumulation of earnings and profits beyond the reasonable
needs of the business. 17
In drafting the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Congress was
met with many complaints from corporations that the accumulated earnings tax provisions were prejudicial to small businesses, that they had been applied arbitrarily in many cases, and
that they constituted a perennial threat to expanding business
enterprises.1 8 While there were some modifications made in
favor of the taxpayer, 19 there was no alteration made in the required degree of tax avoidance purpose. In fact, an amendment
was proposed which would have made it necessary for the taxpayer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the purpose to avoid the surtax upon shareholders be only a substantial
factor in inducing the accumulations.2" This amendment, which
offered virtually the same quantum of tax avoidance purpose
as the test proposed by respondent in the Donnwss case, failed
to pass; and the tax avoidance purpose provisions of Section
102 of the Revenue Act of 1938 remained virtually intact as
found in Sections 532 and 533 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954.
16. H.R. Rep. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1936).
17. Act of May 28, 1938, ch. 289, § 102, 52 Stat. 483; see S. Rep. No. 1567,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1938). To reduce the rate of tax avoidance the Senate
Finance Committee recommended that the taxpayer should have to demonstrate
"by a clear preponderance of the evidence . . . the absence of any purpose to
avoid surtaxes upon shareholders after it had been determined that the earnings and profits have been unreasonably accumulated."
18. U.S. CODE& AD. NEws, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., S. Rep XVII (1954).
19. Section 535(c) of the Code provides for an accumulated earnings credit;
section 534 permits the taxpayer in some instances to shift the burden of
proving the unreasonableness of the accumulation to the government; section
537 included within the meaning of "reasonable needs of the business" anticipated, as well as, immediate needs.

20. Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means Pertaining
to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, 83d Cong., 1st Sess,
pt. 3, at 2142 (1953).
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From this historical study the Court concluded that it has
been the congressional intention to rely increasingly upon an
objective criterion in applying the tax. This criterion is simply
whether the accumulated earnings are in excess of the corporation's reasonable needs. While purpose is still central to the
application of the tax, Congress has created a strong presumption that it exists if an unreasonable accumulation of earnings
and profits is present. To adopt the "dominant purpose" test
advocated by the respondent would be to thwart the congressional intent. To impose the tax only when the tax avoidance
purpose is the dominating or impelling motive would allow the
taxpayer to escape the tax whenever he could demonstrate that
at least one other purpose of equal weight was behind the accumulation policy. It is doubtful whether a judicial balancing of
motives in this manner is possible; at any rate, respondent's
test would go far toward destroying the presumption that Congress created to meet this very problem.
The majority of the Court recognized that some courts might
construe the "one purpose" test as making purpose irrelevant
once the jury found an unreasonable accumulation. Purpose
under the majority's test would be irrelevant only if purpose
and knowledge be equated. This the Court expressly refuted.
While in nearly every case knowledge that a tax saving will
result is present, the taxpayer still may prove that this knowledge did not contribute to the decision to accumulate earnings.
On this final point Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Douglas
were led to dissent from the majority test. They asserted that
the "one purpose" test in effect would nullify the requirement
that a tax avoidance purpose be present. They argued that in
nearly all cases knowledge that a tax savings would result would
be present and that the jury would naturally conclude that since
this knowledge was existent a purpose to avoid the tax must
necessarily be present. To avoid such a result the dissent offered an alternate test. The jury should be instructed that it must
impose the tax if it finds that the taxpayer would not have
accumulated earnings but for the knowledge that a tax savings
would result. Such a test would provide the taxpayer a "last
clear chance" to rebut the Section 533 (a) presumption.
In assessing the majority and minority proposals, one finds
the minority test somewhat difficult to follow. While purport-
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ing to reject the "dominant motive" test, it advocates a test
which in effect would be little different from the dominant
purpose test. The assertion that once an unreasonable accumulation has been found purpose is irrelevant is easily rebutted. In
United States v. Duke Laboratoies,21 in which the jury applied
the "one purpose" test, the circuit court upheld a verdict for the
taxpayer based upon a finding that although there was an un22
reasonable accumulation there was no tax avoidance purpose.
This decision gives validity to the majority's argument that the
one purpose test "still serves to isolate those cases in which tax
avoidance motives did not contribute to the decision to accumulate." 23
JOHN J. JAES, II

21. 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964).

22. Id. at 282. The court had instructed the jury that "the intent to avoid
the income tax with respect to shareholders need not be the sole or dominant
intent in permitting the accumulation."
23. 89 S. Ct. at 508.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 11
1969]

RECENT DECISIONS

INSURANCE-Doctrine of Cancellation by Substitution and
Replacement-Doctrine not applicable in Minnesota. Mutual
Creamery Insurance Co. v. Iowa National Mutul Insurance Co.
(Minn. 1969).
The defendant insurer, Iowa National, issued a fire insurance
policy covering mortgaged business premises owned by the
insured. Pursuant to the mortgage agreement, the mortgagee
was named in the policy in a "union mortgage clause."' In
March, 1965, the insured presented a claim to the defendant.
When informed that the loss was not covered, the insured notified the defendant's agent that the policy would not be renewed
unless the claim was paid.
When this claim was not settled by April, 1965, the insured
engaged the plaintiff's agent to obtain new insurance on the
premises and to cancel the defendant's policy. Plaintiff's agent
then obtained a binder of coverage on the property from his
employer, Mutual Creamery Insurance Co. At the same time, the
agent sent a letter to the defendant which allegedly cancelled the
insured's interest in the defendant's policy. The mortgagee, however, was not notified of the substitution of the policies by either
the plaintiff or the defendant until after a second loss occurred
in May, 1965.
The plaintiff paid for the full amount of the second loss,
naming the mortgagee as loss payee in the draft covering the
damage. Subsequently, the mortgagee assigned any rights it
might have had in the defendant's policy to the plaintiff. The
defendant denied any liability for the second loss under its
insurance policy. The plaintiff contended that the defendant's
policy was in effect and that the defendant should contribute in
the loss sustained by the plaintiff. The United States District
Court for Minnesota held that the defendant's policy had never
been cancelled with respect to the mortgagee and, therefore, was,
in effect, making contribution proper. Mutual Creamery Insurance Co. v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co., 294 F. Supp.
337 (D. Minn. 1969).
The doctrine of cancellation by substitution and replacement
1. A "union mortgage clause" is construed as providing an independent contract between the insurer and the mortgagee, and requires express notice of
cancellation to the mortgagee since he is not affected by any act or default on
the part of the insured (mortgagor). 5 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 3401 (1941); W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE
§ 130 (3d ed. 1951).
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is a variation of cancellation of insurance policies by mutual
consent.2 The doctrine briefly stated is this:
[T]he procuring of new insurance by an owner, or by
his agent authorized so to do, for a term commencing
before the expiration of the term of existing insurance,
with intent to [replace the existing insurance], and no
intent to thereby acquire additional insurance, constitutes in law an effective, voluntary cancellation of the
3
existing insurance.
There are several situations in which this doctrine frequently
arises. One such situation is when the insurer sends notice of
forthcoming cancellation to the insured, who then obtains additional insurance, and a loss occurs while both policies are in
force. Frequently, it arises when the insured desires to change
insurance companies. While the original policy is in effect, he
obtains a second policy, intending to cancel the first policy later.
Again, the loss occurs while both policies are binding.4 In those
jurisdictions which adhere to the doctrine, 5 the prior insurance
is cancelled when the second policy becomes effective.8
Through the operation of the doctrine of cancellation by
substitution and replacement, the defendant insurer in Mutual
Creamenj contended that its policy had been effectively cancelled prior to the loss. The defendant argued that when the
insured obtained the second policy from the plaintiff, its
original policy was cancelled. In only one prior Minnesota case"
had a factual situation arisen suitable to the application of the
doctrine of substitution and cancellation. There, however, the
court had simply avoided the issue altogether and had chosen
not to mention the doctrine. In MutuaZ Creamery, the court
reasoned that since the doctrine had not been applied in the
former case, it was not in effect in Minnesota.
2. Gorman, Cancellation of the Fire Insurance Policy, 1966 INs. L.J. 220,
226 (1966).
3. Bache v. Great Lakes Ins. Co., 151 Wash. 494, 276 P. 549, 551 (1929).
4. Gorman, srupra note 2, at 226.

5. See White v. Insurance Co., 93 F. 161 (C.C.D.R.I. 1899), aff'd, 103 F.
260 (1st Cir. 1900); Larsen v. Thuringia Am. Ins. Co., 208 IIl. 166, 70 N.E.
31 (1904) ; Arnfeld v. Guardian Assurance Co., 172 Pa. 605, 34 A. 580 (1896) ;
Bache v. Great Lakes Ins. Co., 151 Wash. 494, 276 P. 549 (1929). But see
School v. German-American Ins. Co., 228 Pp- 44, 76 A. 507 (1910),.
6. Gorman, supra note 2, at 226.
7. Merchant & Farmers Mut. Cas. Co. v. St Paul-Mercury Indem. Co.,
214 Minn. 544, 8 N.W.2d 827 (1943), aff'd on rehearing, 218 Minn. 396, 16
N.W.2d 463 (1944).
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Having no precedent in its jurisdiction to bind it, the court
chose to follow a series of recent decisions8 which had modified
the doctrine of cancellation by substitution and replacement.9
In the leading case of Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Founders'
Insurance Co.,1° the insured presented a claim to Glens Falls
which was not honored. She then obtained additional insurance
with Founders', intending to cancel the Glens Falls policy, and
a loss occurred while both were in effect. In holding the Glens
Falls policy valid, the California court said that in the absence
of mutual consent there could be no cancellation by substitution
and replacement.1 1 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit further modified the doctrine by holding that it
would not apply where the new insurance was in the form of a
temporary binder, since the new company had not unqualifiedly
bought the risk.12
MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Southwest Baptist College
Inv- 3 was an ideal case in which to apply the doctrine. The
college, in revamping its insurance program, mailed letters to
insurers cancelling all known policies. Through an oversight,
however, the plaintiff's policy was not cancelled. The college
obtained new insurance on all buildings, and when the auitorium burned both policies were in force. Influenced by the
Glens Falls decision, the Missouri court allowed the college to
collect on both policies. 14 The court in MFA bluntly stated that
the doctrine was not law in Missouri and further declared that
even if it was the law, it would not change its decision. 15 The
court reasoned that in instances in which the doctrine was in
effect, mere substitution of policies was not enough to invoke
cancellation. It seemed to believe that mutual consent or agree8. See National Investors Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 359
F2d 203 (10th Cir. 1966) ; Northern Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 4 Ariz. App. 217, 419

P2d 347 (1966); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Founders' Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d
157, 25 Cal. Rptr. 753 (D. Ct. App. 1962) ; MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southwest
Baptist College, Inc., 381 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1964); Baysdon v. Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 181, 130 S.E.2d 311 (1963). But see Virginia
Mut.
9.
10.
11.

Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co., 383 F2d 6 (4th Cir. 1967).
Gorman, supra note 2, at 226.
209 Cal. App. 2d 157, 25 Cal. Rptr. 753 (D. Ct. App. 1962).
!d., 25 Cal. Rptr. at 754-57, 761.

12. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Michaelson, 322 F.2d 304, 306 (9th Cir.
1963).
13. 381 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1964).
14. Id. at 802-03.
15. Id. at 802.
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ment is necessary for the doctrine to apply and cancel the prior
insurance.'
The Mutual C treamery court could have restricted its holding
much further, by relying on Northwestern Mutual Iwsurance
Co. v. MiChaelson,17 and limiting the non-application of the
doctrine to cases in which the additional insurance is a binder.
It chose, however, to simply declare the doctrine inapplicable
in Minnesota. Since the court felt that the insured had cancelled
his interest in the defendant's policy by a clear and unequivocal
request for cancellation, the discussion of the doctrine of cancellation and substitution in Mutual Creamery seems to become
dicta. The court decided that there had been a cancellation as
to the insured and the method used to reach that conclusion
would not alter the decision.
The presence or absence of a mortgagee will also influence the
weight to be attached to this decision. The court held that even
though the insured effectively cancelled his interest in the policy, because of the "union mortgage clause"' 8 the interest of the
mortgagee was not affected. It was found that the necessary
notice of cancellation to the mortgagee was lacking; thus, his
interest in the defendant's policy was not cancelled. The plaintiff's policy was also held to protect the mortgagee because of
the mortgage agreement between the insured and the mortgagee. 19 Therefore, both policies were deemed to protect the
same interest at the same time and against the same risks,
20
making contribution between the insurers proper.
It should be noted that the cancellation as to the mortgagor
did not affect the decision, nor would it have done so if the
doctrine had been applied because of the operation of the "union
mortgage clause." The only possible significance of this case is
16. Id. at 801-02. It is interesting to note that if this court's analysis is
correct, the doctrine is useless, since mutual consent is required under the
doctrine and also, obviously, for the cancellation of policies by mutual consent
of insurer and insured.
17. 322 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1963).
18. See mipra note 1.

19. Mutual Creamery Ins. Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 294 F. Supp.

337, 339, 345 (D. Minn. 1969). The mortgage agreement required the
mortgagor to keep the premises insured for the benefit of the mortgagee. The

court concluded that even though the mortgagee was not named on the face of
the Mutual policy, it did, and should have, received any payments for the loss
under the Mutual policy.
20. 16 G. CoucH, CYcLOPEDrA Op INsURANCE LAW § 62:166 (2d ed. 1966).
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the addition of Minnesota by way of dicta to the group of jurisdictions which do not accept the doctrine as law.
The entire subject of the doctrine of cancellation by substitution and replacement could best be handled by a withdrawal
from its requirements. When the parties wish to cancel outside
of the terms of the policy, it would seem reasonable to make the
insurer responsible for obtaining adequate proof of cancellation,
and to require express mutual consent or agreement for cancellation. This requirement would negate the importance of the
doctrine of cancellation by substitution and replacement and
would, therefore, clarify the requirements for cancellation by
21
mutual consent.
RAYMOND DAVID MASSEY

21. Gorman, supra note 2, at 222.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss3/11

18

et al.: Recent Decisions
SouTH CAitoLINA LAW REVw

[Vol. 21

TORTS-Joint Tortfeasors-Damages for inherently indivisible
injuries proximately caused by negligence of several wrongdoers
may not be apportioned. Rourk v. S&vey (S.C. 1968)..
The plaintiff sustained injuries from a collision between the
two defendants' cars. In his suit against both defendants, the
plaintiff alleged that his injuries were caused by "the joint and
concurrent negligence and recklessness" of both drivers. Over
the plaintiff's objection, the judge instructed the jury that it
might apportion the damages between the defendants according
to the degree of their culpability. Accordingly, the jury returned
an apportioned verdict, granting the plaintiff $45,000 actual
damages against one defendant and $5,000 actual damages
against the other. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court
of South Carolina which held that the instructions given "constituted reversible error where there was sufficient testimony to
create [a] jury question as to actionable negligence and recklessness on [the] part of both defendants combining and concurring
in the proximate or contributing proximate cause of [the] plaintiff's injuries." Rourlk v. Selvey, 164 S.E.2d 909 (S.C. 1968).
When an injury, resulting from two or more causes, is single
and indivisible, the majority of jurisdictions adhere to the doctrine that there may be no apportionment of compensatory damages.1 This general rule evolved from the common law "unity
of the cause of action" concept which was based on the reasoning
that since there was but one wrong the jury could not apportion
the damages. 2 One verdict, determining the total amount of
could
damages recoverable, had to be returned and the plaintiff
3
exact this judgment from any of the joint tortfeasors.
The Rourk decision brings South Carolina law within the
general rule4 by overruling a doctrine initiated in White 'v.
M'Neily, 5 which permitted apportionment of actual damages on
the basis of each joint tortfeasor's degree of culpability. The
1. 52 Ais. Jun. Torts § 123 (1944); W. PRossER,
§ 42, at 250 (3d ed. 1964).
2. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25

OF TORTS

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
CAwiF.

L. Ray. 413, 418

(1937).

3. 52 Ar. Ju. Torts § 123 (1944); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
§§ 44-45 (3d ed. 1964).
4. See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413,
418 n.34 (1937). Prosser cites a 1917 case as overruling South Carolina's
apportionment rule. The case, National Bank of Savannah v. Southern Ry.,
107 S.C. 18, 91 S.E. 972 (1917), actually had no relation to the apportionment
OF TORTS

rule since it involved a plaintiff suing each of the joint tortfeasors separately.

5. 1 Bay's L. 11 (S.C. 1784).
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supreme court's reasoning in Rourk emphasized that the authority in South Carolina for such apportionment was both scant
and dubious and did not warrant the utilization of the stare
decisis doctrine.
In only three South Carolina cases has the apportionment of
damages rule been sustained:6 White v. M'Neily,7 BeVin V.
Linguard,8 and Rhane v. City of Sumter.9 In each of these
cases, the Rourk court found flaws which substantially weakened the impact of these decisions as precedents.
The court said that the defendants could not invoke the
authority of the White case because the only record of the decision to apportion the damages was contained in the reporter's
comments on the case, published 25 years after the case was
tried.'0
The Bevin case involved a trespass action in which the plaintiff was beaten and his home ransacked by the defendants. The
jury apportioned the damages, and the two defendants appealed
on the ground that, the defense being joint, the jury was precluded from awarding several damages. The apportioned verdict
was upheld. In reviewing Bevin, the supreme court observed
that the issue in Bevin did not challenge the apportionment
doctrine itself but was an attempt to create an exception to it,
which was disallowed." Bevin was further discredited as an
authority because of the fact situation involved. The plaintiff's
injuries were not the result of a single impact, as in Rourk, but
6. This excludes four respondeat superior cases dealing with apportionment
of damages-Mullikin v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, 184 S.C. 449,
192 S.E. 665 (1936); Thomas v. Southern Grocery Stores, 177 S.C. 411, 181

S.E. 565 (1935.) ; Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E.

443 (1927) ; Jenkins v. Southern Ry., 130 S.C. 180, 125 S.E. 912 (1924). The
Jenkis and Johnson cases held that actual damages could not be apportioned

in a respondeat superior case. The Thomas and Mullikin cases modified this
position holding that if the master ratifies or authorizes the servant's actions,
or if the master's actions combine with the servant's as the proximate cause of
the injury, the jury may apportion damages. The supreme court in Rourk did
not consider these cases because of the factual difference between suing a
master and servant as joint tortfeasors on the basis of their contractual relationship and joining wrongdoers related only by their negligence.

7.
8.
9.
10.

1 Bay's L. 11 (S.C. 1784).
1 Brev.'s L. 503 (S.C. 1805).
113 S.C. 151, 101 S.E. 832 (1919).
Rourk v. Selvey, 164 S.E.2d 909 (S.C. 1968). The court stated:
The defendant is clearly not entitled to stare decisis application of
the White case, the report of which consists merely of the noncontemporary comments of the reporter of the decision of a trial
court.

Id. at 913.
11. Id.
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were separately inflicted injuries for which an apportionment
12
can properly be made.
In Rhame,the plaintiff was injured when his car ran into an
open ditch on a city street. The jury returned a verdict for $425
against the city and $425 against the plumber who had opened
the ditch. The defendants asked on appeal that the verdict be
interpreted as a single judgment for $425 against both defendants. This request was denied. Rhame was dismissed by the
Rourk court as a case which did not challenge the apportionment involved, but which actually stood for the theory that
unless objection to a verdict is raised before the jury is discharged, the objection is waived.' 3
Opinions of South Carolina judges about the rule have
ranged from statements that the practice is "very questionable" m 4 "scarcely . . .logical," 15 or "peculiar,"' 6 to the more
severe criticism found in Jenkins v. Southen Railway Co.17
[O]pposed as it is by the authority of the supreme
tribunal of the Nation, and by almost every other state
court (and criticized as it has been by the judges who
felt imposed to follow it), the rule should be confined
to the precise conditions which gave it birth.' 8
While criticizing the logic of the apportionment rule, these
cases accepted White as a valid precedent or, as in Deese .v.
Williams,'0 avoided determining the issue of the validity of the
rule itself by reaching a decision on another aspect of the case.
Perhaps the most important reason the rule had never been
effectively challenged as such was that until Rourk no plaintiff
ever raised the issue. The supreme court in Rourlk stated that
only the plaintiff has the right to question the validity of apportioning damages, for it is the plaintiff who is prejudiced. The
rule deprives him of his "right to a verdict for the full amount
' 20
of damages sustained, against all wrongdoers.
12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 248 (3d ed.
1964)--.
13. Rourk v.Selvey, 164 S.E.2d 909, 913 (S.C. 1968).
14. Smith v. Singleton, 2 McMul.'s L. 184 (S.C. 1842).
15. Lide, Some "Uniques" in South Carolina Law, 1 S.C.L.Q. 209, 214

(1949).
16. Boon v.Horn, 3 Strob.'s L. 159, 160 (S.C. 1848).

17. 130 S.C. 180, 125 S.E. 912 (1924).
18. Id. at 187, 125 S.E. at 914.
19. 237 S.C. 560, 118 S.E.2d 330 (1961).
20. Rourk v.Selvey, 164 S.E.2d 909, 913 (S.C. 1968).
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While emphasis has been placed on a plaintiff's prejudice, in
some instances the apportionment doctrine could also be prejudicial to a defendant. For example, a defendant could be prejudiced in a situation in which several tortfeasors caused the
injuries, but one defendant's contribution was negligible. With
no rule allowing apportionment, the jury would be less likely
to hold this particular type of defendant, liable at all, knowing
that if it did, he could be made to pay the entire amount. The
apportionment rule would make it easier for a jury to return
a verdict against such a defendant, while not actually finding
that his negligence was an actionable contributing cause to the
injury.
The Rourk decision will provide a plaintiff with greater
leeway and a stronger guarantee of recovery of the entire
amount of damages than was available under the apportionment
doctrine. A plaintiff will no longer be restricted by a jury's
somewhat arbitrary determination of the amount of damages
recoverable from a defendant according to the jury's approximation of that defendant's degree of culpability.
JAms B. PnIssLY
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TORTS-Products Liability-Lending institution has a duty to
prevent construction and sale of seriously defective homes which
lender almost totally finances. Connor v. Great Western Savings
& Loan Association (Cal. 1968).
The plaintiffs purchased homes in a residential development
from builder-vendor Conejo Valley Development Company,'
an under-capitalized and inexperienced land development corporation almost totally financed by the defendant, Great Western Savings & Loan Association. 2 The defendant consented to
finance the residential development with the following stipulations: (1) Defendant had the right to make construction loans on
the homes to be built; (2) defendant had the right of first refusal to make loans to purchasers;3 (3) Conejo was to pay the
fees and interest obtained by other lenders from purchasers not
financing with defendant; (4) Conejo was to pay 1 percent for
qualified loans and 1.5 percent for poor risks loans; and (5) defendant was to control the course of development. Before agreeing to provide money for the purchase of land, the defendant demanded that these same stipulations be agreed to on subsequent
developments built by Conejo, 4 that Conejo repurchase the land
from defendant within one year, and that a specified number of
homes be sold to purchasers before construction began. In addition the defendant reserved the right to withhold disbursement of funds if construction did not conform to certain plans
and specifications.
Conejo did not have visibly cracked soil 5 analyzed, and built
homes with ill-designed foundations. The defendant neglected to
1. Conejo Valley Development Company will hereinafter be denoted as

Conejo.

2. The court emphasized that the extent of Great Western's involvement
was $3 million, compared with less than $36,000 (possibly only $5,000) of
Conejo's money. Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609,
613-14, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373-74 (1968).
3. Over 80 percent of the home owners obtained purchase money mortgages
from Great Western in the form of 24 year loans at 6.6 percent interest
secured by first trust deeds.
4. Conejo had an option with the owner of an adjoining 477 acre parcel to
purchase the land and construct residential homes.
5. Adobe soil is common in Southern California and such soil was present
throughout the tract. Adobe soil is distinguished easily by the naked eye in dry
weather in areas where the ground cover is sparse. When it dries and contracts, the surface cracks into plates, frequently hexagonal in shape and 10
to 12 inches in diameter. Several Conejo employees and Great Western personnel noticed the characteristic cracks before and during construction. See
Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609, 616, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369, 376 (1968). See also Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 263 Cal.
App. 2d 186, 61 Cal. Rptr. 333, 339 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
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correct these deficiencies even though it had an inspector to visit
the construction site weekly, before and during construction, to
verify that money was being disbursed only for work completed.
Two years later the soil expanded, and the foundations cracked
causing serious damage to the homes. In a suit against various
parties involved in the tract development, the trial court entered a judgment of nonsuit for Great Western. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of California reversed and remanded: Where
the success of the lending institution depended on inducing purchasers to finance with the institution, the lender controlling
the course of the residential development and knowing that the
construction company it was financing was working on thin
capitalization, the institution had a duty to prevent construction and sale of defective homes to purchasers. Connor v. Gireat
Western, Savings & Loan Association, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1968).
In the past two decades, the demand for single-family homes
has made residential construction one of the major businesses in
the nation.7 Speculative builders-developers s construct over 90
percent of these single-family dwellings each year.9 Residential
developments containing these dwellings require an enormous
sum of money, 10 but the average developer's assets are usually
insufficient to satisfy the cost. The speculative developer's
solution is a lending institution, and savings and loan associations have provided the preponderant share of financing for
the under-capitalized land developer. 1 When the demand for
6. See Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d 186, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 333 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).

7. The dollar outlay for residential construction in recent years has
amounted to as much as 4.4 percent of gross national product. In the past five
years of the current business expansion, private residential construction
expenditures totaled $127.9 billion, and more than 4.6 million residential units
were started. UIrTED STATES SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE, SAVINGS AND LOAN
FAcr BOOK 1967, at 39 [hereinafter cited as 1967 FAcT BOOK].
8. The speculative builder does not contract with purchasers before construction, but speculates that he can find a buyer before completion of the
homes. Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender For Structural Defects
in New Housing, 35 U. Cmi. L. REV. 739, 742 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 35
U. Cni. L. REV. 739 (1968)]. See also 1967 FAcr BooK at 24.
9. Nearly one million single-family dwellings are built each year. 35 U.
Cai. L. REV. 739, 742 (1968).
10. The average cost of constructing a single-family dwelling in 1966 was
$17,000. This figure did not include the cost of land and other nonconstruction
items commonly included in the selling price. 1967 FAcT BOOK at 26.
11. The small developer's lifeline is the savings and loan associations. Lefcoe

& Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE L.J. 1271
(1966)
at 81.

[hereinafter cited as Lefcoe & Dobson]. See also 1967 FAcT BOOK
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housing is great, however, the under-capitalized builder-developer often purchases large tracts with funds acquired at high
rates of interest. 12 Consequently, he is compelled to cut corners
in construction's and is required to sell the houses immediately.
The purchasers, suffering personal and/or property damages
from faulty construction, moreover, have found inadequate
remedies when seeking compensation from the often insolvent
developer.
14
In reaction to this lack of remedy, many recent decisions
have extended the area of recovery to allow the innocent purchaser to defeat the common law defense of caveat emptor.15
Connor has extended the scope of recovery available to purchasers by announcing the view that a lending institution may be
liable to the purchasers of defective homes in a development
which the lender has almost entirely financed. The decision of
the court was based on two factors: (1) The existence of a reasonable opportunity possessed by the lender to control the defective construction; and (2) the six elements established in
Biakanja v. Irving' which determine whether a defendant will
be liable to a third person with whom he is not in privity. A
discussion of these two factors will reveal the reasoning underlying the court's decision in Connor.
In finding that Great Western had a reasonable opportunity
to control construction, the court looked to the relationship between the lender-defendant and the builder-developer. The de12. Lefcoe and Dobson found that during the fourth quarter of 1965 statechartered loan associations in California reported yields on construction loans
from a minimum of 13.5 percent16to a maximum of 16.8 percent. Lefcoe &

Dobson, mupra note 11, at 1276 n. .
13. See Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d 186, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 333 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).

14. See, e.g., Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 71, 337 P2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689

(1962) (home builder was liable to purchasers of homes for negligence in
building without sufficiently investigating to discover that land was loosely
filled and hence unsuitable for building) ; Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 362
P.2d 345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1961) (subcontractor held liable for negligent
installation of concrete in a private pool) ; Totten v. Gruzen, 52 NJ. 202, 245
A.2d 1 (1968) (architects and engineers could be liable for defective designs
in buildings); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965)
(builder was held strictly liable for faulty construction of homes in a housing
development); Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E2d 81 (1968).
(builder-vendor held liable for negligent construction, not only to purchaser,
but to third parties).
15. The general rule is that the vendee takes the land at his own peril unless
the principles of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment are involved in the
transaction. 55 AM. JuR. Vendor and Purchaser § 57 (1946).
16. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
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fendant voluntarily undertook to finance and develop the tract
and to develop a market for the homes to which the purchasers
would be directed by the builder for their financing. These relationships, and the fact that the defendant was clearly under
a duty of care to its shareholders 17 not to jeopardize their investment by allowing faulty construction, made Great Western a
participant in the development. This fact presented Great Western with a duty to exercise its power of control over the builder
to prevent the construction of defective homes by withholding
funds if construction did not conform to specifications.
There was a vigorous dissent stating that although a savings
and loan association may have greater expertise and experience
in home construction than purchasers, their personnel are not
builders, nor do they possess the skills to conduct a detailed
inspection. The inspectional duty imposed by the majority,
however, implies that the defect must be of such a nature that it
could be brought to the attention of the lender's inspectors by
an ordinary examination. In the present case signs of expansive soil were easily distinguishable to the naked eye,' 8 yet the
lender failed to require soil tests or to examine foundation
plans.19 It is submitted that the imposition of such an inquisitive duty would not only protect the prospective purchasers,
but also satisfy the affirmative obligation to prevent structural
defects which the lender owed to its shareholders.
The determination of whether, in a specific case, the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a
matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors.
These factors, as established by Biakanja and employed in
Connor, are: first, the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; second, the foreseeability of harm
to him; third, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury; fourth, the closeness of the connection between the de17. See In re Western States Building-Loan Ass'n, 50 F.2d 632 (S.D. Cal.
1931) (building and loan association is "debtor" of shareholder).
18. See discussion, supra note 5.
19. Great Western required Conejo to submit plans and specifications for
various models of homes to be built and the type of work to be performed on
each house. Conejo, which at no time employed an architect, purchased plans
and specifications from another developer that had been prepared for other
developments. Great Western, however, did not examine these purchased
foundation plans or make any recommendations as to the design or construction of the homes because it was preoccupied with selling prices and sales.
447 P.2d at 613-14, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74.
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fendant's conduct and the injury suffered; fifth, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct; and sixth, the policy
20
of preventing future harm.

The court found that Great Western's transactions were intended to affect the plaintiffs significantly in that the success of its investment depended entirely on Conejo's ability to
induce the plaintiffs to buy the homes, and to channel the buyers to Great Western for purchase mortgages. The dissent contended, however, that the defendant made no representations of
the quality of the homes to the prospective purchasers, and that
there was no evidence that any homeowner relied on any representations. The transaction, therefore, was intended to affect
the lender and borrower, and not for the direct or indirect benefit of the plaintiffs. 21
The majority found further that the defendant was negligent
in failing to delve into Conejo's financial background. Such an
investigation would have revealed a foreseeable risk that Conejo
would cut corners because of under-capitalization and the stringent stipulations imposed by Great Western. The dissent insisted
that it was scarcely foreseeable by the lender, as a result of providing funds for construction, that gross structural defects
would exist in the homes. 22 The entire court conceded that it was
unquestionable that the plaintiffs suffered serious damages to
their homes.
The last three elements illustrate that defendant had an obligation to its shareholders to exercise its power to prevent structural defects in homes it financed. The relationship between the
parties gave defendant the power to withhold funds unless the
work was properly completed, 23 and Great Western, by employing reasonable care, could have required soil tests and recommended well-designed plans for the foundations-two important
steps 24 in the construction of a house. Defendant, by not exercis20. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).

21. Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, 447 P2d 609, 624-25,

73 Cal. Rptr. 369 384-85 (1968).

22. Id. at 625, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 385.

23. If an inspector's report reveals a structural defect, loan associations
frequently withhold loan funds until the defect has been corrected. Therefore,
savings and loan associations have the financial bargaining power to influence
land developers to meet adequate standards of construction workmanship. 35
U. Cur. L. Rav. 739, 748 (1968).
24. Id. Most serious defects usually occur in the house's foundation.
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ing this duty of care, not only failed in its obligation to its
shareholders, but also failed in its obligation to the purchasers-a home being a major investment for the average purchaser. 25
The dissent asserted that the defendant's only duty was to its
shareholders and depositors. Great Western was a lender whose
role was supplying capital. The lender had no rights to receive
the profits of the enterprise, and, therefore, was insulated from
the risks assumed by the entrepreneur. The defendant drove no
nails, drew no plans, and built no homes. Its position was
analogous to any other lender: it had no contractual or statutory
right to conduct the operations of the builder-borrower. 20 Conversely, Conejo and associated parties were entrepreneurs whose
function was to discern what goods or services were in demand
and to gather and arrange the factors of production in order to
supply to the consumer, at a profit, the goods and services
desired. 27 In meeting this demand, the entrepreneur undertook
calculated risks that the demand might be less than anticipated
or costs of production might be greater. He not only risked
losing his capital investment but he incurred obligations to the
supplier of land, materials, labor and capital, and he should be
liable for defects in his products to those persons injured
thereby.
The dissent ardently insisted that the decision places an unreasonable and unjust duty on the lending institution that could
result in their financial downfall:
[A] finance company would, by lending money for the
purchase of an automobile, be liable for injuries to
third parties caused by the owner's negligent operation
of the vehicle. 28
It is submitted that the court did not extend the duty of the
lending institution to this extreme. It appears that such a duty
would depend on the closeness of the relationship between the
parties, and that the relationship in Connor made the institution
much more than a lender.
Connor should alert lending institutions, in states permitting
25. Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609, 618, 73

Cal. Rptr. 369, 378 (1968).

26. Id. at 623, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
27. Id. at 621, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 381.

28. Id. at 624, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
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savings and loan associations to develop land,29 to exercise more
than a reasonable amount of care to prevent damages caused by
structural defects. At the same time, it must be recognized that
a slight variance in the facts of Connor could bring a different
result. Consider, for example, a case in which the lending institution does not handle the consumer's purchase mortgage; or
when the lender finances less than 50 per cent of the residential
development; or in which the builder-vendor is solvent; or when
the defective construction is not discoverable by an ordinary
inspection. It is debatable also whether the lender would have
been liable in Connor to third parties or purchasers other than
the original buyer.30 These hypothetical propositions were unanswered by the court in the present case, and the strong dissent
may have a limiting influence upon the result in future cases of
this nature. In lieu of court action, the solution to this broad
problem could come from a legislative or administration enactments. State and/or local agencies or legislatures could revamp
building codes, give more power to particular regulatory
agencies, make licensing requirements more strict, compel bonding of home builders, or provide for industry-wide insurance.
It is doubtful, however, that legislatures at least will undertake
such a task in the near future. The courts, therefore, must use
their discretion and power to resolve cases in this category until
a clarifying statute is enacted.
DoNAm

V. Miims

29. Only 13 states permit savings and loan associations to purchase and

develop land. These states are Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,

Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
and Washington. Six states-Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, Maryland, and California-account for more than half of the nation's savings and
loan associations, yet only two of these states allow land investment. Lefcoe
& Dobson, supra note 11, at 1273 n.5. Interview with William N. Bowen,
Executive Vice President, South Carolina Savings and Loan League, in
Columbia, S.C., Mar. 24, 1969, Mr. Bowen explained that a case of this nature
is not likely to confront South Carolina savings and loan associations at any
time in the near future. South Carolina savings and loan institutions are prohibited from investing in land developments, and the state sanctions mutual,
rather than shareholder, savings and loan associations.
30. The courts have extended liability of the builder-vendor to third parties
other than the original purchaser. See Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 161
S.E.2d 81 (1968). However, it is questionable whether the courts will extend
the liability of a lending institution to parties other than the original purchaser.
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